

WEST-WIDE GOVERNANCE PATHWAYS INITIATIVE

Phase 1 Straw Proposal

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I. INTRODUCTION

The July 14, 2023, letter from several Western state regulators to the Western Interstate Energy Board and the Committee on Regional Electric Power Cooperation, advanced a proposal “for ensuring that the benefits of wholesale electricity markets are maximized for customers across the entire Western U.S.” The regulators contemplated that the creation of a new non-profit regional entity could “serve as a means of delivering a market that includes all states in the Western Interconnection, including California, with independent governance.” Their vision included the eventual assumption by the new entity of the California Independent System Operator’s (CAISO) Extended Day-Ahead Market (EDAM) and Western Energy Imbalance Market (WEIM),¹ “avoiding a duplication of the investments and expenses of the market infrastructure that has already been created, and avoiding a deterioration of the benefits of those programs [...]”²

With this guidance, in late 2023 the West-Wide Governance Pathways Initiative Launch Committee was formed, comprising a diverse set of utilities, consumer advocates, public power, generators and power marketers, public interest organizations, and others. The Launch Committee developed a range of potential market design options along with evaluation criteria and associated legal and technical questions.³ At the time, the Launch Committee contemplated the selection of one option or a combination of options along the spectrum of identified possibilities to achieve the regulators’ vision. The Launch Committee presented this framework to stakeholders on December 15, 2023, requesting stakeholder comments on this approach. One guiding principle for the Launch Committee was to ensure that a governance structure could evolve to allow market participants to voluntarily participate in a regional transmission organization (RTO), but not to mandate that any entity join an RTO.

Many of the stakeholder comments on the Evaluation Framework Paper recommended a staged or stepwise approach to increase the independence of Western market governance.⁴ In

¹ WEIM and EDAM represent the extension of the CAISO’s real-time and day-ahead market functionality to all participating Western BAs.

² The July 14, 2023, letter is available here: <https://www.westernenergyboard.org/wp-content/uploads/Letter-to-CREPC-WIEB-Regulators-Call-for-West-Wide-Market-Solution-7-14-23-1.pdf>.

³ The Mission and Charter of the Pathways Launch Committee explains the Launch Committee members’ respective decision-making authorities. It is available here: https://www.westernenergyboard.org/wp-content/uploads/Mission-and-Charter_Dec-21-Ex-B-FINAL.pdf.

⁴ Balancing Authority of Northern California (BANC), California Community Choice Association, Joint Commenters (Western Resource Advocates (WRA), Northwest Energy Coalition (NWECC), Renewable Northwest (RNW), Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), Western Grid Group (WGG) and Sustainable FERC Project (S-FERC), Northwest & Intermountain Power Producers Coalition, NV Energy, PacifiCorp, Portland General Electric, Public Generating Pool, Seattle City Light, Southern California Edison Company, and

support of this stepwise recommendation, stakeholders pointed to the complexity of achieving the regulators' ultimate vision, the time the overall effort would likely take, and the value of demonstrating an early commitment to more independent governance of Western markets. Consistent with these observations, the Launch Committee is proposing a stepwise approach with three incremental steps in market evolution:

Step 1: Early success. This step demonstrates early commitment to the regulators' vision through substantive changes within the scope of existing law, while continuing to develop more ambitious pathways to independent governance.

Step 2: Durable, independent governance of markets and other potential services. This step aims to implement the regulators' vision of a regional energy market with a large and inclusive footprint, maximizing independence while leveraging the existing market infrastructure to minimize costs. Step 2 is designed to be able to evolve and accommodate the addition of new, voluntary services as the framework matures.

Step 3: Toward an RTO. As Step 2 matures, the Launch Committee contemplates further evolution toward services of an RTO for balancing authorities (BA) and other market participants to join voluntarily. Proposing a particular design for these subsequent incremental stages goes beyond the scope of the Launch Committee's work, but Steps 1 and 2 have been developed with a clear line of sight to those potential voluntary future services beyond the energy markets. The Launch Committee refers to this later evolution of additional services, inclusive of a full suite of RTO services, as Step 3.

Since January 2024, the Launch Committee has researched and analyzed the complex elements required to effectuate both Steps 1 and 2 and offers in this straw proposal an initial vision of market governance evolution.⁵ The Step 1 proposal in this paper includes several design elements and a summarized approach to implement the proposed changes. The Step 2 proposal, which necessarily is more complex, advances a higher-level vision and seeks stakeholder comments for further refinement. Legal analysis received from Perkins Coie⁶ and

Western Freedom. Comments are posted here: <https://www.westernenergyboard.org/commentsonevaluationcriteria/>.

⁵ The Launch Committee anticipates that Phase 1 of the Pathways Initiative will conclude with our release of a final revised proposal after receiving stakeholder feedback on this straw proposal. An accompanying stakeholder guidance document describes the anticipated Pathways phases and the Launch Committee's specific requested feedback on this straw proposal.

⁶ Perkins Coie is a law firm with a large commercial and regulatory practice that was retained by the Launch Committee to provide legal analysis regarding California state law and federal energy regulatory law.

technical support from the CAISO have helped inform the Launch Committee’s efforts and direction.

The purpose of this paper is to present the Launch Committee’s proposal for both Steps 1 and 2 and reasons for narrowing the focus to a stepwise approach that utilizes the preferred options.

Section II, addressing Step 1:

- (1) Describes changes to the status quo required to take an early incremental step toward regional independent governance (Option 0);⁷
- (2) Considers those changes in the context of the evaluation criteria developed by the Launch Committee and informed by stakeholder feedback;
- (3) Discusses the related legal analysis; and
- (4) Provides a scope of remaining work to implement the Step 1 solution.

Section III, addressing Step 2:

- (1) Recommends the general structure and key elements of a durable pathway to achieve regional independent governance over EDAM and WEIM;
- (2) Notes in broad strokes how enabling legislation in California would substantially reduce the legal risk associated with the considered options and likely enable this pathway to be comprehensive and foundationally sound;
- (3) Describes open issues and variations within the general recommended structure (Option 2 or Option 2.5 (a variation of Option 3)) that require more investigation and stakeholder feedback; and
- (4) Describes plausible future pathways for services beyond the energy markets, without recommending any particular one.

Section IV, explains why, in light of the straw proposal to implement Option 0 in Step 1 and to consider Option 2 or Option 2.5 in Step 2, the Launch Committee proposes to defer further consideration of Options 1, 3, and 4 at this time.

Section V, explains the next process steps planned by the Launch Committee and includes specific requests for feedback from stakeholders drawn from topics throughout the straw proposal. The Launch Committee is seeking stakeholder feedback by May 8, 2024, on this straw proposal.

⁷ The Launch Committee throughout this straw proposal maintains fidelity to the nomenclature of the options that we first presented in the Evaluation Framework Paper. In our next revised proposal, we may rename these options (particularly the leading candidates for Step 2—Options 2 and 2.5) to reduce the numeric labels that readers must follow.

Several appendices offer the reader additional resources to further understand the Launch Committee's work. In particular, Appendix H evaluates each of the options according to the criteria established by the Launch Committee.

The Launch Committee underscores that this straw proposal presents specific input from state regulators and consumer advocate representatives on the Launch Committee. The regulators and consumer advocates have informed our efforts through the development of recommendations to incorporate an important new evaluation criterion adopted in response to stakeholder feedback: *"Respect for state authority to set procurement, environmental, reliability and other public interest policies."*⁸ As detailed below, the recommendations for Steps 1 and 2 incorporate mechanisms to safeguard consumer interests and respect individual state policies in future market design.

⁸ An updated and complete list of Evaluation Criteria is included in Appendix G.

II. STEP 1 PROPOSAL

A. Introduction

Step 1 would substantively move the existing governance of the CAISO's Western Energy Imbalance Market (WEIM) and Extended Day-Ahead Market (EDAM) toward greater independence from the CAISO Board of Governors (BoG). These changes should be familiar to stakeholders who have followed the evolution of CAISO governance. Step 1 aims to promote broader participation in WEIM/EDAM markets through three key changes made on a timely basis: 1) Elevate WEIM Governing Body (GB) decision-making from "Joint Authority" to "Primary Authority", 2) Modify the current dispute resolution process to include a "dual filing", and 3) Incorporate public interest safeguards for participating states in the WEIM GB. These changes would:

- ❖ Give the WEIM GB "Primary Authority" over the market-related matters currently within the scope of its "Joint Authority" with the CAISO BoG, channeling any disagreement by the CAISO BoG into the existing dispute resolution process defined in Section 2.2.2 of the Charter for Energy Imbalance Market Governance (WEIM Charter);
- ❖ Modify the current process for resolving disputes between the WEIM GB and the CAISO BoG to conclude, except in time-critical exigent circumstances, with the CAISO making a "dual filing" of both bodies' proposals, with no stated preference, for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to render a decision; and
- ❖ Incorporate changes to the WEIM Charter responsibilities to account for consumer and state interests in its decision-making process. This step also contemplates a continued advisory role for a Body of State Regulators (BOSR) in WEIM GB and CAISO BoG decision-making, and an active role in representing state interests, when necessary, in any "dual filing" before FERC.

As described in more detail below, the Step 1 governance transition would be triggered when a set of geographically diverse non-CAISO WEIM Entities equal to or greater than 70% of the CAISO balancing authority area (BAA) annual load for 2022 have executed EDAM implementation agreements. Assuming all the entities who have expressed an intent to join EDAM as of April 10, 2024, execute implementation agreements, only one additional utility representing at least 10,000 GWh of load and located in the Southwest would be required to trigger the Step 1 governance transition.

Step 1 is just the first step toward the full realization of the regulators' vision of energy markets with governance independent of any single state, participant, or class of participants. Step 1 is a near-term incremental increase in independent governance that shows commitment to that trajectory while continuing to protect reliability, control costs for consumers, and respect state policies. It recognizes that the time required to implement Step 2 does not neatly align with the

pace of various entities' day-ahead market decisions, and it is responsive to requests by some entities to take early action, as work moves forward on Step 2.

The Perkins Coie legal analysis that accompanies this paper has assessed the Step 1 proposal for compliance with existing California state law and FERC regulations. It has concluded that the proposal may be implemented within the scope of existing state law and, while FERC precedent strongly suggests FERC approval of the proposal is feasible, FERC approval will likely still be required. Thus, it is a meaningful first step that can be taken quickly.

B. Step 1 Key Elements⁹

1) Elevate WEIM GB Decision-making from “Joint Authority” to “Primary Authority”

Existing Scope of WEIM GB Authority. Article IV, Section 1 of the CAISO Bylaws delegates to the WEIM GB “Joint Authority” with the CAISO BoG to approve or reject certain proposed tariff amendments as specified in the WEIM Charter.¹⁰ Charter Section 2.2.1 specifies that the WEIM GB has Joint Authority for tariff rules that are “*applicable to the WEIM/EDAM Entity balancing authority areas, WEIM/EDAM Entities, or other market participants within the WEIM/EDAM Entity balancing authority areas, in their capacity as participants in WEIM/EDAM.*”¹¹ As cited here, the scope of Joint Authority was recently expanded to include day-ahead market and other related rules that are applicable to EDAM Entities.¹²

Joint Authority excludes, however, “any proposals to change or establish tariff rule(s) applicable only to the CAISO balancing authority area or to the CAISO-controlled grid,” which are reserved for CAISO Sole Authority (Charter Section 2.2.1).¹³ The WEIM GB also has “Advisory Authority”

⁹ See Appendix B for a Step 1 schematic.

¹⁰ The CAISO Bylaws are available here: <https://www.caiso.com/Documents/ISO-Corporate-Bylaws-amended-and-restated.pdf>.

¹¹ Further details on the application of the “apply to” rule for decisional classification is included in the Western EIM Governance Review – Phase Three (EDAM), Governance Review Committee Final Proposal, Jan. 9, 2023, at 13-24, available at: <https://www.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/EDAM-Governance-Final-Proposal-WEIM-Governance-Review-Committee-Phase-3.pdf>.

¹² The Board of Governors approved the expansion on March 20, 2024. The meeting recording is available at: <https://www.caiso.com/informed/Pages/BoardCommittees/BoardGovernorsMeetings.aspx>; the amended WEIM Charter is available at: <https://www.caiso.com/Documents/AttachmentB-CharterforEnergyImbalanceMarketGovernanceproposedredline.pdf>.

The adopted expansion also extends Joint Authority to one topic area that would otherwise fall outside of the “apply to” test: tariff changes that directly establish or change the formation of locational marginal prices (LMP) for products common to the WEIM or EDAM markets. Hereafter in this paper, the Launch Committee intends references to the current scope of joint authority under the “apply to” to encompass this LMP formation addition as well. Readers may refer to the GRC’s Phase 3 Final Proposal for more background on this addition and its relation to potential future market power mitigation rules (*Supra*, note 4).

¹³ The GRC’s Phase Three Final Proposal further provides: “For avoidance of doubt, the joint authority definition set forth above does not include measures, such as parameters or constraints, the ISO may use to ensure reliable operation within its balancing authority area.” (at 39).

for tariff rule changes that would apply to the real-time and day-ahead markets but are not within the scope of its Joint Authority. Section 2.2.3 of the Charter provides procedures to resolve disputes over the classification of a decision made pursuant to the CAISO BoG approved process and the “apply to” test.

The adoption of the functional “apply to” test to determine the scope of Joint Authority marked a substantial extension of WEIM GB’s authority over the real-time and day-ahead markets. This change significantly elevated the WEIM GB’s role in decision-making for an extensive portion of the CAISO tariff.

Transition to Primary Authority. Step 1 would elevate the tariff areas currently under Joint Authority to Primary Authority for the WEIM GB. The scope of elevated areas would be determined using the same “apply to” test used today to identify areas of Joint Authority. The scope of WEIM GB decision-making authority would not be increased or decreased, and the areas of CAISO Sole Authority would not be increased or decreased. The Charter Section 2.2.3 procedure for dispute resolution over decisional classification would remain unchanged, except for the dual-filing provision discussed below.

Primary Authority would be implemented by providing only the WEIM GB, rather than both bodies, the initial authority to approve or reject a proposed tariff rule. If the WEIM GB approves a proposed tariff rule, the rule would be placed on the CAISO BoG consent agenda for approval, with the option for full briefing and discussion if requested. The CAISO BoG may, however, remove the matter from the consent agenda and reject the proposal by majority vote, triggering the dispute resolution procedures discussed below.

2) Modify the Current Dispute Resolution Process to Include a “Dual Filing”

Existing Dispute Resolution Process. CAISO Bylaws Section 1(b) provides that the BoG “shall not approve the addition, deletion or modification of a part of the Tariff” within Joint Authority unless the proposal has first been submitted to the WEIM GB as required by the procedures in the Charter.¹⁴ In the case of a dispute, Section 2.2.2 of the Charter delineates a multi-step dispute resolution procedure. If the dispute resolution procedures are exhausted without agreement, however, the CAISO BoG may authorize a FERC filing to seek approval of its proposed tariff rule under certain limited circumstances. The WEIM GB rights in this circumstance are limited to an opportunity to provide a “written opinion or statement on the proposed tariff” that may be included in the CAISO filing.

Modified Dispute Resolution Process. Step 1 would leave unchanged the procedure for submission of a tariff change approved by both the WEIM GB and the CAISO BoG (under the

¹⁴ Amended and Restated Bylaws of the California Independent System Operator Corporation, as amended through March 20, 2024, available at: <https://www.caiso.com/Documents/AttachmentA-Bylaws-AsAdoptedNovember32021proposedredline.pdf>

Primary Authority approach described above) and the general dispute resolution procedures delineated in Charter Section 2.2.2. The pivotal change would require the CAISO, in the event that dispute resolution procedures do not resolve the dispute and either body votes in favor of a proposal that the other opposes, to make a “dual filing” with FERC pursuant to its Section 205 rights.¹⁵ The dual filing would present both the CAISO BoG proposed tariff and the WEIM GB proposed tariff as “co-equal” proposals, with no preference for either proposal indicated in the filing. This requirement for co-equal filings would also apply in circumstances where either the CAISO BoG or the WEIM GB believes a tariff change is necessary, but the other body does not.

One exception to the dual filing requirement remains. The CAISO BoG may still authorize a filing with FERC, including a statement or opinion by the WEIM GB, when a change is a *time-critical* exigent circumstance to preserve reliability or market integrity. The WEIM GB may, following a time-critical exigent circumstance filing and FERC resolution, still trigger the dispute resolution process to consider a durable solution.

The Primary Authority model proposed here bears a resemblance to the consent agenda model, also known as “primary authority,” that was in place when the Governance Review Committee (GRC) began its evaluation in 2019 that led to the current Joint Authority model. The Step 1 Primary Authority model differs, however, in two key respects. First, the move from the former primary authority model to the current Joint Authority model in 2021 significantly expanded the scope of decisions that fall within shared authority; moving from the current Joint Authority model to the new Primary Authority model would retain this expansion of decisional scope. Additionally, the proposed Primary Authority model uses a dual filing mechanism at FERC to resolve disputes, placing WEIM GB proposals on equal footing with CAISO BoG proposals.

3) Incorporate Public Interest Safeguards for Participating States in WEIM GB

Existing Safeguards. Today state law and the WEIM Charter work together to serve the public interest. California Public Utilities Code §345.5 articulates California-specific public interest factors and related directives that must be addressed in the CAISO’s management of the

¹⁵ Section 205 is the key provision of the Federal Power Act under which “public utilities” (generally, owners of FERC-jurisdictional facilities, including independent system operators and regional transmission organizations), make filings at FERC seeking approval of organized wholesale market rules and related services. Any party may file a complaint under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act to challenge an existing tariff provision of a public utility that had been filed and accepted under Section 205. The standard of review by FERC for filings under Section 205 (and therefore the legal burden born by the filer) is a demonstration that the filing is just and reasonable. In contrast, the standard of review by FERC for Section 206 filings is substantially higher—the party must establish that an applicable tariff provision is unjust and unreasonable, before ever reaching the question of whether a potential alternative is itself just and reasonable, or somehow *more* just and *more* reasonable than the protested provision originally filed under Section 205. The Perkins Coie legal analysis that accompanies this straw proposal explains in more detail the nature of Section 205 rights, their significance, and their various forms in other contexts.

transmission grid and “related energy markets.” The CAISO BoG has been clear that this statutory framing is not interpreted as a fiduciary requirement to prefer California consumers in decision-making, and the BoG has repeatedly recognized the inter-dependent nature of all market participants and consumers served by the market.¹⁶ The WEIM Charter also includes several responsibilities aimed at controlling costs and mitigating market power for the benefit of consumers, as well as maintaining compliance with applicable legal requirements including “environmental regulations and states’ renewable energy goals.”

Augmented Safeguards. As Step 1 further empowers the WEIM GB, it will be important to ensure the body uses its authority in a way that considers the interests of consumers of all BAs and other entities participating in the markets, as discussed in Appendix D. The WEIM Charter would be updated to embed in its responsibilities and mandate the principle of respect for the public interest and for individual state policies, for all customers in the footprint. Regulators and public advocate representatives have proposed language for the Charter that the Launch Committee supports, which is provided in redline in Appendix E.

In addition to augmenting the WEIM GB responsibilities and mandate, Step 1 contemplates a continued, active role for state regulators via the BOSR to ensure those responsibilities are met. The BOSR would continue to work with the WEIM GB and stakeholders to provide input into decision-making and, as necessary, provide its opinions to FERC in coordination with any submission of a proposed tariff rule within the scope of the WEIM GB’s Primary Authority.

Additionally, the Regional Issues Forum (RIF) will continue to collect stakeholder input and provide written opinions on issues being considered within an ongoing CAISO stakeholder proceeding or that otherwise impact the energy markets. The RIF continues to provide a valuable voice for stakeholders in the CAISO policy development process. While Step 1 does not propose any changes to the RIF, Step 2 will consider additional opportunities for stakeholder engagement in the policy development process.

4) Trigger for Step 1 Implementation

Step 1 promotes expansion of the geographic footprint of EDAM in the near term to accelerate the benefits of greater regional coordination to consumers while Step 2 is fully developed and implemented. To ensure that governance changes are responsive to an expansion of the markets, Step 1 implementation would be deferred until triggered by the addition of incremental EDAM load meeting the following requirements:

¹⁶ In addition, the CAISO Bylaws were amended on March 20, 2024, to include the addition of Article II, section 3: “Administration of Markets. Consistent with its status as a nonprofit public benefit corporation, and to enhance the efficient use and reliable operation of ISO Controlled Grid, the Corporation will weigh the interests of all stakeholders within the footprint of the markets that it administers, including the Corporation’s balancing authority areas and WEIM balancing authority areas.”

- The trigger requires the execution of implementation agreements by a set of geographically diverse non-CAISO WEIM Entities equal to or greater than 70% of the CAISO BAA annual load for 2022..¹⁷
- The incremental load additions beyond PacifiCorp, BANC, and Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) must be geographically diverse, including at least one new participant from the Southwest and one from the Northwest, and will exclude California participants.

With Portland General Electric (PGE) announcing its intent on March 21, 2024, to join EDAM, the trigger requirement translates to additional participation by at least one Southwest BA representing at least 10,000 GWh of load to meet both the load and the geographical diversity requirements.¹⁸ This assumes that all the entities who express an intent to join EDAM execute implementation agreements.

Ensuring timely implementation will require advance preparation of Step 1 tariffs by the CAISO and, potentially, participating EDAM entities. The Launch Committee anticipates that the CAISO, together with stakeholders, will develop a schedule and tariffs in advance of the triggering event to accommodate the expansion expeditiously following the triggering event.

C. Legal Analysis of the Step 1 Proposal

Perkins Coie, on behalf of the Launch Committee, performed a risk-based analysis of the options presented in the Launch Committee’s Evaluation Framework Paper. In brief, they analyzed the California legal and FERC regulatory risk associated with the range of options. The Step 1 proposal generally reflects the Evaluation Framework Paper’s Option 0. Perkins Coie determined that this option “provides a low risk of violating California law if the CAISO BoG retained the option to invoke its ‘time-critical exigent circumstance’” right. Likewise, it presents a “low FERC regulatory risk” because the structure resembles similar structures previously accepted by FERC. The full legal analysis accompanies this paper.

¹⁷ Using 2022 WECC Annual Load Data, the CAISO BAA represented 224,800 GWh. At the time of publication, the entities that have announced their intention to join EDAM include PacifiCorp, BANC, LADWP, and Portland General Electric. The combined loads of these entities total 64% of the non-CAISO WEIM load, and the addition of NV Energy’s load would bring the total to 70%, triggering Step 1.

¹⁸ PGE announced its intent to join EDAM on March 21, 2024.

III. STEP 2 PROPOSAL

A. Introduction

Step 2 would accomplish the primary goal articulated by the July letter from the states by creating a durable governance structure with a fully independent board that has Sole Authority to determine the market rules for EDAM and WEIM, building incrementally on the movement toward greater independence in Step 1. Step 2 would also offer a governance structure that could bring additional optional services under its purview that are beyond the energy markets, such as reliability coordination, transmission functions, and balancing authority consolidation.

Step 2 necessarily has more open issues than Step 1, but the Launch Committee believes the general structure proposed here, including the variations under consideration that stakeholders are invited to comment on, offers a viable way to achieve the vision of the Pathways Initiative.

Step 2 involves four key elements:

- ❖ Create a Regional Organization (RO) that is a new nonprofit corporation separate from the current CAISO, as a successor organization to the WEIM GB.
- ❖ Pass enabling legislation to narrow the corporate scope of the CAISO and allow a complete transfer of some of its existing management responsibilities, while preserving the CAISO's balancing authority responsibility.
- ❖ Transition decision-making over WEIM/EDAM matters from the "Primary Authority" of the WEIM GB in Step 1 to the RO's "Sole Authority" within the same integrated tariff, while possibly continuing some form of shared authority for a limited number of tariff provisions.
- ❖ In collaboration with interested market participants and stakeholders in the West, create various new pathways for West-wide services beyond WEIM/EDAM using the RO as a governing entity and potentially a host entity for those services.

Step 2 is intended to be the realization, beginning with energy markets, of the regulators' vision. It aims to balance the need for independent governance with the need to minimize costs, by leveraging the CAISO's considerable infrastructure and experience, and retain the growing benefits of the WEIM. This approach is not the only way to accomplish the regulators' vision, however it is likely the most efficient way to maximize consumer benefits. The remainder of this section describes the key elements of Step 2 as proposed by the Launch Committee, as well as several open issues and decision points that require more investigation and stakeholder feedback.

With respect to the Pathways options outlined in the Evaluation Framework Paper, the general approach proposed here encompasses both Option 2 and a variation of Option 3 (referred to as

“Option 2.5”) that maintains a single integrated tariff. For the reader’s reference, Appendix A contains an updated comparison table of these original options (this table is also in the accompanying legal analysis). Appendix F has schematics of the structures described below and the difference between the two leading options.

We address the reasons for narrowing Step 2 to Options 2 and 2.5 in Section IV below. Both options are designed to deliver the four key changes above that are described in detail below. They also share several characteristics. Both contemplate:

- A new non-profit corporation;
- “Sole Authority” over market design and decision-making;
- Some limited degree of corporate reservations by the CAISO to match the scope of its residual authority, if any;
- An option to have public utility status under the Federal Power Act, giving the RO sole Section 205 filing rights;
- CAISO responsibility for the ministerial administration of an integrated tariff;
- CAISO responsibility for market operations, subject to the RO’s sole governance authority; and
- A contract determining the relationship between the CAISO and RO.

The Options differ in four important respects.

- First, Option 2.5 contemplates the complete, or nearly complete, transfer of sole governance authority along with elements of institutional authority and responsibility; Option 2 contemplates a narrower transfer of governance authority alone over decision-making on tariff amendments and tariff implementation.
- Second, with the broader transfer of authority in Option 2.5, broader responsibilities are likely to follow, including, for example, compliance and penalty risk, with potential increased costs to be borne by the RO and thus the market.
- Third, with the broader transfer of responsibility and authority in Option 2.5, it may be possible to further limit the CAISO’s corporate reservations.
- Fourth, the nature of the contracts between the CAISO and the RO will differ; the Option 2 contract would be crafted to delineate the market governance versus operating

authority of the RO and CAISO, while the Option 2.5 contract would be developed as a pure contract for services in which the CAISO operates only as a vendor.¹⁹

Each of these differences and other details involves a complex mix of business and legal considerations, which are generally discussed below and require further evaluation. And there are many variables affecting how the relationship between the CAISO and the RO may be structured. The key takeaway is that the more the RO seeks to create its own autonomous capabilities to provide services to participants, the higher degree of costs, responsibilities, liabilities, and obligations must be assumed by the RO. One purpose of this section is to highlight that fundamental trade-off.

B. Key Step 2 Elements

This section will describe each of the four key elements in turn. The discussion reflects the Launch Committee's work since last fall to gather information and evaluate the implications of different approaches. Stakeholders are asked to provide feedback on how the described tradeoffs might be weighed against each other as the Launch Committee considers its final recommended design option for Step 2. The third element below highlights the tradeoffs and differences between Options 2 and 2.5, a key open issue before the Launch Committee.

1) *Key Element: Creation of a Regional Organization as a new legal entity that is a nonprofit corporation separate from the CAISO.*

Step 2 begins by forming a new legal entity, referred to here as the RO, that is a standalone nonprofit corporation separate from the CAISO. The RO's formation allows governance of the energy markets (EDAM and WEIM) to change from the model of a chartered entity underneath the CAISO umbrella that has delegated authority from the BoG. It allows the authority to determine market rules to be vested in a separate corporation with a separate board.

Step 2 would move beyond the augmented authority ("Primary Authority") of the WEIM GB in Step 1 to "Sole Authority" to determine the vast majority of WEIM/EDAM matters. The boundaries and meaning of this authority are described in more detail below.

The new RO would serve as a successor organization to the WEIM GB and would draw on many elements of the WEIM GB as a starting point, including the WEIM Charter as modified in Step 1.²⁰ The general nominating process for the WEIM GB, relying on a sector-based stakeholder nominating committee, may be a sound basis for selecting the RO's board, but the Launch Committee anticipates the need for some potential refinements and improvements, such as

¹⁹ Conceptually, under Option 2 the RO has governance authority over the CAISO's regional energy market. In contrast, under Option 2.5, the CAISO is the contractual operator of the RO's regional energy market. Under both Options, the CAISO operates the markets and the RO governs the market rules.

²⁰ The WEIM Charter would need further modification to serve as the basis of articles of incorporation or bylaws for the RO.

expanding sector participation on the Nominating Committee. The Launch Committee also anticipates that more than five board seats (the current number of seats on both the CAISO BoG and the WEIM GB) may be needed to reflect the diverse interests of a West-wide footprint.

The Launch Committee envisions that the RO would begin with a relatively modest size, consisting of a board of directors and a small initial dedicated staff and legal counsel (internal or external). The board itself would meet FERC's standards for independent governance of an RTO, including the absence of any financial conflicts of interest related to the energy markets and market participants. The board would also meet the broader criterion of the Launch Committee related to a governance structure independent of any single state, participant, or class of participants. In addition, the RO may need to be capable of serving as a public utility under the Federal Power Act, in the event the RO directly files its own tariffs at FERC or determines the content of filings by the CAISO as a public utility within the meaning of the Federal Power Act.²¹ We also anticipate that the RO would become qualified to be a registered entity with the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) and North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), in the event that the RO directly assumes the role of being the functional entity for one or more NERC-defined functions required to ensure reliable operation of the bulk electric system.

Some elements of creating the RO and the overall Step 2 proposal can be implemented sooner than others, and this may argue for beginning implementation prior to consideration of further legislation in California. And regardless of further legislative change in California, the creation of an RO with the attributes described here may prove attractive on its own merits as a locus for future regional market initiatives. For example, even in the absence of legislation, the RO could assume the same Primary Authority delegated to the WEIM GB in Step 1 but in a more arms-length form.²² Similarly, the structure would allow, for example, the RO to become the host of the NERC-defined Reliability Coordination function without any change in state law, either offering such a service directly to Western entities or contracting through the CAISO. Finally, the formation of the RO with the capacity to be a public utility is a necessary precursor to filing any future tariffs at FERC under the Federal Power Act. The RO described here would be a way to build that institutional capacity for future regional initiatives. In that sense, it is a vehicle for more services beyond WEIM/EDAM. Additionally, if legislation proves slow to emerge the RO could begin exploring structures that would allow BAAs outside California to move forward together on various initiatives while maximizing opportunities for continued co-optimization with the California balancing authority area, if necessary.

²¹ Qualifying as a public utility is not limited to direct ownership or operation of physical facilities subject to the jurisdiction of FERC, it also encompasses entities responsible for tariffs or contracts that affect wholesale electric rates (sometimes termed "paper facilities"). See accompanying Perkins Coie legal analysis.

²² See the analysis of Option 1 in the accompanying legal analysis, subject to continued exigent circumstances authority remaining with the CAISO BoG.

RO Funding

As a starting point, the Launch Committee anticipates that the current funding mechanism for the WEIM GB could be the basis for supporting the RO in its simplest form. Additional requirements for financing, liability protection, and auditability are closely tied to the ultimate scope of responsibilities of the RO and so are addressed in detail under the “contractual relationship” subsection below.

Role of states

The WEIM BOSR, or a similar successor organization, would continue to have a significant role in reviewing and opining on policy proposals and actions of the RO to protect all affected consumers. This is a critical role that the Launch Committee wishes to underscore. We are evaluating further how to empower participating states with this role, including with respect to our eighth evaluation criterion (“Respect for state authority to set procurement, environmental, reliability and other public interest policies”), and we encourage stakeholder feedback on this topic.

Role of stakeholders

With the launch of the RO, the Launch Committee recognizes the opportunity to re-evaluate how stakeholders engage with and help shape WEIM/EDAM rules. Recent experiences in the West with greater stakeholder involvement in regional decision-making indicate a strong desire from some sectors for consideration of new meaningful ways for stakeholders to shape the rules and implementation practices of regional energy markets and other programs. These recent experiences include stakeholder-driven initiatives and committees piloted by the CAISO (e.g., the Gas Resource Management Working Group), the Program Review Committee of the Western Resource Adequacy Program, and the Markets+ Participant Executive Committee of Southwest Power Pool’s Markets+ offering.

The Launch Committee continues to evaluate how best to structure the stakeholder process for providing input into the RO’s consideration of market rules and any other matters under its authority. We expect the RO to be responsible for overseeing the stakeholder process associated with developing regional market rules. This topic, which is the target of the Launch Committee’s request for U.S. Department of Energy funding, may also require a thorough evaluation by the RO board itself as one its early and central tasks.

In the meantime, the Launch Committee may make a recommendation for a robust RO-specific stakeholder process that would expand upon or adjust the existing stakeholder processes of the CAISO and other examples such as those listed above. We expect this to be addressed in a future workshop process. We look forward to stakeholder feedback on this important topic, both on the desired outcome and the appropriate timing of the effort.

Transition from Western EIM Governing Body

The role that the current WEIM GB might play in any transition to an RO requires further evaluation. The Launch Committee has not considered in detail how this might work. Clearly, the WEIM GB could provide a bridge to the new structure and provide continuity on substantive market issues as well as relationships with stakeholders, but these details remain to be considered. The Launch Committee anticipates that some transitional period would be required. Solutions may emerge as the scope of the RO comes into clearer focus, and a nominating committee for the new RO Board may also be situated best to address the transitional issues.

Other open issues

The Launch Committee does not make a recommendation about the appropriate form of a non-profit corporation for the RO (for example, a 501(c)(3) versus a 501(c)(4)), the state where it should be incorporated, the state where it should primarily conduct its business, nor the jurisdiction where litigation involving the RO should be adjudicated. These topics require additional legal counsel and deliberation. We do offer several high-level observations.

- *Nonprofit status:* Tax factors play an important role in incorporation decisions and state rules regarding these matters can affect the cost of any debt. Tax counsel would be required to evaluate this topic to develop a recommendation. In addition, restrictions on certain nonprofit activities and the extent to which a public interest focus is supported may be factors in determining the appropriate form of nonprofit.
- *State of incorporation:* Locations across the West would be under consideration, but the Launch Committee also notes that there may be some value in selecting another location that offers general incorporation advantages, such as the state of Delaware.
- *Place of business:* Maintaining a close familiarity with the CAISO's present business, including market operations and personnel, does suggest value in maintaining physical proximity to the CAISO headquarters for at least some RO staff, but this by itself need not suggest a principal place of business.

2) *Key Element: Passage of enabling state legislation to allow a complete delegation or transfer of some of the CAISO's existing management responsibilities to the RO (not to include the CAISO's Balancing Authority function).*

There are functions that the RO could perform without state legislation. As noted above, there may be value in establishing the RO to be ready to provide desired services and to continue the trajectory toward greater autonomy of governance. Legal counsel has opined, however, that enabling legislation in California is likely necessary to bring about a complete handover of

authority over the WEIM/EDAM rules. Such legislation would remove a material risk of violating the California Corporations Code and Public Utilities Code that apply to the CAISO today.²³

The Launch Committee recognizes a strong abiding interest among California decisionmakers and stakeholders to preserve the management of the BA function as a corporate duty of the CAISO, similar to the status of BA autonomy outside of the CAISO. Preserving the CAISO's BA responsibility, subject to the ongoing oversight of the BoG, would be a meaningful way to separate out a core reliability-related function of the CAISO and keep it within the purview of California elected officials and policymakers, regardless of the final structure of Step 2 and the pathways to services beyond the energy markets. This approach would address an issue noted in our Evaluation Framework Paper about creating greater parity, as it were, between the ability of both the CAISO and non-CAISO BAs to elect to join and be subject to services overseen or directly offered by the RO. Given that the BA is the primary unit of participation in the WEIM and EDAM, our proposal ensures that control of this reliability-related function does not get swept up by, or somehow drafted onto, a transfer of other management responsibilities from the CAISO BoG to the RO.

The Launch Committee underscores that the approach outlined here—targeted legislation that preserves the CAISO's responsibility for its BA function—is fundamentally different than prior policy or legislative proposals on the topic of reforming CAISO governance. Rather than asking the California State Legislature to regionalize the CAISO as an institution, this legislation would enable the CAISO BA to participate in a market managed by another entity. In our view, this new approach would accommodate walling off the corporate responsibility for BA management from further regionalization of market and related services, which greatly enhances the chance of success. Doing so would somewhat complicate but still maintain the value proposition of potentially regionalizing more services through the RO at a future date. This last topic is explored in more detail under the fourth element of Step 2 below.

3) *Key Element:* Transition to “Sole Authority” of the RO over WEIM/EDAM within the same integrated tariff.

In the Launch Committee's view, the single most important measure of independent authority over the energy markets is the exclusive and unilateral authority (“Sole Authority”) to decide the content of section 205 filings at FERC. “Sole Authority” is not the only way to measure the independence of the RO from the CAISO, and it is necessarily bounded by several factors, as this section will describe. But it is the guiding objective of the Launch Committee in proposing Step 2.

²³ The Perkins Coie legal analysis that accompanies this straw proposal describes this likelihood and the legal risks involved. As the evaluation notes, there are various ways to mitigate the risk of the RO's “Sole Authority” violating current state law, but these mitigation options generally erode the independence of the RO and make its authority effectively no greater than “Primary Authority” under Step 1.

Step 2 would move governance of the energy markets beyond the WEIM GB's meaningfully greater independence in Step 1, relative to the status quo, to a more complete form of autonomy in Step 2. The tradeoffs described in this section for how precisely to structure this form of independent governance, including the relationship between the CAISO and the RO, should not obscure the essential point that in all cases the RO would hold sole decision-making authority over the vast majority of the tariff provisions that apply to EDAM and WEIM, and to market participants in EDAM and WEIM in that capacity.

Summary of transition

Upon the incorporation of the RO, establishment of its capability to assume responsibilities described in this section, and the passage of enabling legislation in California, the CAISO BoG and WEIM GB would be empowered to transfer certain responsibilities from the two entities to the RO. In this process, the WEIM GB would be dissolved as a chartered entity under the CAISO umbrella. The CAISO and the RO would enter into a contractual agreement that in the narrowest form would be a governance agreement (Option 2) and in its broadest form would be a contract for services in which the CAISO would become a vendor to the RO (Option 2.5). Under the latter arrangement, the RO would become the outward facing entity offering energy market services to Western market participants. This important distinction between the form of contractual agreement between the CAISO and RO is explored more below. It is the primary open issue before the Launch Committee.

The agreement executed between the RO and the CAISO would detail, among other things, the duties of the CAISO as the market operator and remedies to ensure unbiased operation of the markets. Over the course of the governance transition in Step 2, the CAISO would continue to seamlessly operate the energy markets over which the RO now has exclusive and unilateral authority, thereby avoiding disruption to the existing markets, participants in them, and consumers affected by them. Avoiding such a disruption is a critical consideration for the Launch Committee.

To complete the transition to Sole Authority, the CAISO's bylaws and tariff would be modified to memorialize the relationship between the CAISO and the RO, including the delegation or allocation of unilateral and exclusive 205 rights, as defined in the agreement executed between the two entities. The CAISO would file the modified tariff at FERC.

Scope of authority

The scope of Sole Authority would be based, as a starting point, on the same decisional classification that already identifies the scope of the Primary Authority in Step 1 using the WEIM/EDAM "apply to" test. But the Launch Committee has identified at least two potential exceptions to simply using the same test. Both exceptions suggest the potential need for some

ongoing shared authority for the RO (rather than “Sole Authority”) over a narrowly limited scope of topics.

First, Joint Authority today²⁴ and Primary Authority as proposed in Step 1 encompass proposals to change or establish rules that apply partially—but not solely—to the CAISO BAA or the CAISO-controlled grid, to the extent such proposals apply to WEIM/EDAM participants (and BAAs) in their capacity as WEIM/EDAM participants. If using the present “apply to” test results in severing the CAISO BoG’s decision-making authority over such provisions by making all of them subject to the RO’s sole authority at the outset of Step 2, this would be an inappropriate outcome, even with the change in law outlined above. The CAISO would still ostensibly have management responsibility over its own BAA and controlled grid, but it would have lost the authority to determine how to manage them by virtue of the transfer of authority over WEIM/EDAM rules. The CAISO’s ongoing responsibility for its BA function in particular, which the Launch Committee intends to mirror the responsibility WEIM/EDAM Entities have for their own BAAs, may require keeping some proposals under “Primary Authority” (or some other form of shared authority with the CAISO BoG) that are closely related to the CAISO BAA.

Second, there are certain generic provisions of the tariff (for example, Section 13: dispute resolution) that apply equally to market participants under WEIM/EDAM and participants in other CAISO services, including the participating transmission owners under the Transmission Control Agreement. The “apply to” test may already allow any change to these provisions to separate out and isolate their effect on WEIM/EDAM. For example, the provisions could be divided within the tariff in the course of modifying them, splitting approval between the BoG alone for what applies outside WEIM/EDAM and the RO alone for what applies to WEIM/EDAM. But these provisions deserve further review as well.

In general, the intent and expectation of the Launch Committee is that the vast majority of the tariff rules covered by Joint Authority today would be covered by RO Sole Authority in Step 2. Making a more definitive recommendation that precisely defines the two areas of potential exceptions above requires a detailed analysis of the tariff, which has over 1,500 subsection headings and appendices at merely two subsection levels below the main numbered sections. The Launch Committee has begun this analysis and anticipates that completing it will require additional stakeholder feedback.

Because the “apply to” test today is a functional one—a strength of the test that the Governance Review Committee rightly emphasized in recommending its use—there is no master list of current tariff provisions that are necessarily under its scope. Instead,

²⁴ On March 20, 2024, the CAISO BoG unanimously adopted a motion to amend the CAISO Bylaws and the Charter for EIM Governance to implement the previously approved final proposal of the Governance Review Committee to expand the scope of joint authority to encompass EDAM and refine the “apply to” test. This BoG implementation decision had awaited conclusive acceptance by FERC of the EDAM tariff. This subsection of the Charter, as adopted by the BoG on March 20, is shown in Appendix C.

identification of the decisional authority arises when market changes are proposed that would lead to a tariff change. Thus, this important question about the scope of, and exceptions to, “Sole Authority” in Step 2 requires more analytical work.

Finally, the Launch Committee notes that the CAISO implements some tariff provisions that are a direct outgrowth of requirements established by California state agencies and that apply solely to market participants within California. We expect these to fall cleanly outside of the scope of the “Sole Authority” proposed here, just as they do today. This includes, for example, resource adequacy provisions in the tariff (e.g., sections 41: Procurement of Reliability Must-Run Resources, and 43A: Capacity Procurement Mechanism).

Other limitations on Sole Authority

The “Sole Authority” at the heart of Step 2 still has important boundaries, aside from the potential topical exceptions to its scope described above. Namely, since the CAISO would remain the market operator in both narrow and expansive versions of the agreement executed with the RO, the RO could not establish market rules that unilaterally expose the CAISO as a corporation to excessive risks that endanger the corporation itself. For example, adopting a market rule that would require the CAISO to dramatically increase its financial bonds or jeopardize its credit rating would not be permissible. Similarly, adopting a market rule that required the CAISO to violate the laws of physics in market operations would not be permissible. The Launch Committee anticipates that these types of unilateral RO actions would be delimited in the agreement between the RO and the CAISO. They pertain to corporate risk rather than policy judgments about the energy market rules and their implementation.

The Launch Committee has attempted to identify scenarios in Step 2 under which the CAISO BoG should have an ongoing corporate responsibility in emergency situations to make unilateral decisions either in lieu of the RO board or over the objections of the RO board. Apart from the corporate jeopardy limitation identified above, the Launch Committee does not at this time anticipate Step 2 carrying over the “exigent circumstances” exceptions that govern Joint Authority today and would affect Primary Authority in Step 1. The Launch Committee seeks feedback from stakeholders on scenarios under which some form of a “panic button” in Step 2 might be appropriate or necessary (apart from the corporate jeopardy identified above), under which the integrity of the WEIM/EDAM operations could be maintained in emergency situations without the express approval of the RO board.

Single integrated tariff

The RO’s Sole Authority in Step 2 to determine WEIM/EDAM rules could be carried out either in a single integrated tariff or in a separate new tariff filed at FERC (either by the RO directly or by the CAISO on the RO’s behalf). The single integrated tariff is the model used today under WEIM and EDAM, with some decision-making authority held by the WEIM GB within the single tariff.

The same model would be used in Step 1 as well. Extending that model to Step 2, at least at the outset, would represent a further incremental evolution, as opposed to the RO filing an effectively new tariff at FERC.

The Launch Committee has deliberated about the merits and drawbacks of these two alternatives. We propose that for purposes of administrative integrity, continuity with Step 1 (including the effectiveness of the functional “apply to” test to date), and cost savings, the CAISO would remain the tariff administrator of a single integrated tariff at least at the outset of Step 2. The CAISO would carry out the ministerial act of making filings on behalf of the RO pursuant to the RO’s sole decision-making authority.

This governance structure of sole 205 rights held by separate parties in the same tariff represents an extension of a well-established precedent of exclusive and unilateral (i.e., sole) 205 rights held by transmission owners over transmission revenue requirements and associated issues in RTO/ISO tariffs. This includes, in a variety of forms, the ISO-New England, MISO, NYISO, and PJM tariffs. It also bears similarities to a variety of voluntary delegations by RTO/ISOs to non-public utilities (committees of either stakeholders or state regulators) to determine the content of the RTO/ISO section 205 filings. The proposed structure here is novel with respect to the breadth of anticipated tariff provisions that would be affected and in their potential dynamic growth over time. This novelty represents slightly higher FERC regulatory risk than having separate tariffs, but it is likely feasible under existing FERC policy and precedent, particularly if the delineation is clear between the areas of sole RO authority, sole CAISO authority, and shared authority. Our analysis here draws on the Perkins Coie legal analysis that accompanies this straw proposal, which describes these precedents and risks in more detail.

The following factors support maintaining a single integrated tariff for the energy markets overseen by the RO:

- 1) Lower administrative start-up costs, including:
 - a. Continued use of some version of the “apply to” test as a well-understood functional test that would facilitate migration of decision-making authority to the RO; and
 - b. Avoidance of practical challenges of separating out tariff provisions into a new tariff, given the interrelated nature of the existing tariff; and
 - c. Avoidance of direct costs associated with the RO filing a separate new tariff;
- 2) A potentially shorter implementation timeframe to achieve full decision-making independence;
- 3) Seamless continuity for WEIM/EDAM governance from Joint Authority today to Primary Authority in Step 1 to Sole Authority in Step 2;

- 4) Continuity of existing contracts executed between the CAISO and market participants and vendors (including some agreements with more than two parties);
- 5) Avoidance of the regulatory and market risk of filing a new tariff while the markets are already operating; and
- 6) Reliance on previous interpretations of the current tariff and associated business practices, increasing predictability and lowering risks for market participants.

Conversely, several factors may argue for creating a separate tariff:

- 1) Greater perceived or real independence from the CAISO by having an entirely separate tariff;
- 2) Lower regulatory risk of FERC finding impermissible a single integrated tariff with divisions of sole 205 rights and shared rights between different parties;
- 3) A slight regulatory risk of FERC accepting a filed change in the integrated tariff that thereby renders another part of the tariff, administered by the other governing entity, unjust or unreasonable; and
- 4) A potentially stronger starting point for the RO to gain decision-making authority over other additional services or to offer such services directly without being constrained by an integrated tariff.

On balance, the Launch Committee finds that the factors in support of maintaining a single integrated tariff—at least for WEIM/EDAM, but not necessarily for other, future services—are strong enough to recommend this structure at least at the outset of Step 2. Should stakeholders or the RO board later reconsider this approach and determine that a separated tariff offers compelling advantages, then that option would remain available. More fundamentally, the Launch Committee has concluded that the Sole Authority itself over provisions in an integrated tariff is the root of the RO’s independence, rather than whether it is exercised in an integrated tariff or a separate tariff.

Form of contractual relationship

Step 2 as recommended here could be addressed by both “Option 2” as described in the Evaluation Framework Paper and “Option 2.5” as described in the accompanying legal analysis to this straw proposal. The Launch Committee has tentatively concluded that Option 2 is an attractive and feasible pathway for securing independent governance of the energy markets, and it is probably the fastest and least-cost pathway to that end. By its nature, it remains a more integrated and incremental approach, closer to the status quo in structure than more disaggregated approaches to governance reform. This incrementalism may have intrinsic

political, regulatory, and commercial value, but it does cut against more thoroughgoing institutional independence that stakeholders may value.

At this juncture, the Launch Committee puts forward its tentative conclusion about Option 2 more as an observation than a recommendation. The competing alternative pathway that has all of the same features outlined throughout this section is “Option 2.5,” which makes a bigger break with the status quo by transferring all market responsibilities to the RO and positioning the CAISO as a vendor under contract to the RO to operate EDAM and WEIM. The RO itself would be the outward-facing entity offering EDAM and WEIM to market participants (albeit as a contracted service via the CAISO), and by virtue of this plenary authority would become subject to a variety of audits, compliance requirements, and financial liability. We refer to this option “2.5” because it resembles Option 3—a contract-for-services model with a separate tariff—but maintains a single integrated tariff as in Option 2, with the CAISO as the ongoing tariff administrator. Indeed, Option 2.5 may be considered a variation of Option 3, but for clarity we have given it a different name.²⁵

Much turns on the form of the contractual relationship between the CAISO and the RO. In general, there is no scenario in which the RO holds all of the authority over market services but none of the responsibility or liability. Authority and responsibility (including liability) generally go hand in hand. To the extent the RO is structured to be more than a narrow decision-making body over market rules, the more the RO must assume institutional and liability features of the CAISO itself (or any market operator).

Except for any legislative change that may be needed to allow the CAISO to turn over market oversight to a third party, the Launch Committee has not identified any general legal barriers to the CAISO offering services in Step 2 in a vendor mode under a contract. As discussed above, the CAISO would need to protect itself from exposure to excessive risks as a corporation as a result of any contractual agreement, regardless of the counterparty (for example, a counterparty forcing the CAISO to issue large bonds or complete infeasible tasks). Where the challenges of a more expansive contractual agreement (such as Option 2.5) arise are not in the general proposition but with more specific issues. We have identified three in particular: financial liability, staffing, and existing contracts. We address each issue in turn.

Contractual issue #1: Financial liability

Like any RTO/ISO, the CAISO has a variety of ways to cover its financial exposure as a market operator and provider of other services. In 2022, the CAISO’s annual operating expenses were \$247 million. The CAISO recovers its costs (operating, debt service, capital expenditures, and

²⁵ We note that in all three options (2, 2.5, and 3) the Launch Committee envisions the CAISO continuing to retain the physical assets necessary to operate the energy markets. Option 2.5 does not involve a divestiture or transfer of assets. Rather, it involves a service contract that details how those assets would be deployed by the CAISO on behalf of the RO.

maintenance of operating reserves) by assessing various charges to market participants, in particular a Grid Management Charge (GMC)²⁶ and other fees (e.g., participation fees for WEIM, Reliability Coordinator services, and generator interconnection studies). Under the tariff, the CAISO maintains an operating reserve as part of its revenue requirement, which is 15% of the current year's operating and maintenance budget (so on the order of \$30-40 million), a debt service reserve, which is 25% of the debt service to be paid during the year, and a capital reserve whose amount depends on future anticipated capital expenditures.

The CAISO's corporate status allows it to issue debt, including public (municipal) debt through qualified conduit issuers. For example, the CAISO incurred its current bond obligations in 2021 when it sold (through an issuer) \$174 million of revenue bonds, of which \$165 million was outstanding at the end of 2022. The GMC and other sources of CAISO revenue, plus other financial protections in the CAISO tariff, are the basis on which bondholders have confidence that they will be repaid.

The CAISO requires market participants to post collateral (or maintain an equivalent line of credit) that is equal to their estimated liability, according to the credit standards specified in the tariff. This means that the CAISO does not bear the risk of loss if a market participant defaults on payment. Such losses do not come off the CAISO's balance sheet. In addition, perhaps the most significant protection for both the CAISO and for bondholders is that the CAISO has a lien on market revenue—it has a priority claim against market-related receipts to protect itself further against, for example, parties in default of payment. This lien is more significant because of how high the coverage ratio is between the GMC and total market settlement collections—well above 20:1 in recent years (for example, in 2019, total CAISO market settlement collections were \$4.7 billion compared to a \$200 million GMC).

In addition to the financial security provided through the lien on market revenues, the CAISO has provisions in its tariff that potentially allow it to spread the cost of a substantial regulatory penalty to market participants in certain cases. Such regulatory penalties may be imposed, for example, by WECC, NERC, FERC, or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. If such a fine or any other regulatory penalty is imposed on the CAISO and there is no means or basis for a one-time allocation to market participants, the CAISO maintains substantial operating reserves that are available to pay the penalty.

Given these various protective features, the Launch Committee understands that the CAISO does not maintain insurance to cover the risks of market participant defaults, losses in the energy markets, or regulatory compliance. Like most similar corporations, the CAISO does

²⁶ The GMC is the principal charge assessed to wholesale market customers by the CAISO to recover its costs.

maintain broad insurance coverage for various other risks (for example, common protection such as errors and omissions, directors and officers, cybersecurity, property, and automobile).²⁷

Finally, to ensure compliance with bond covenants and various regulatory and auditing requirements, the CAISO maintains substantial corporate compliance and internal audit teams who focus solely on these functions and who interface with other staff with compliance responsibilities that are embedded in business units throughout the corporation.

The Launch Committee lays out in detail how the CAISO protects itself financially to make clear some of the capitalization and other liability protections that the RO might be expected to take on under a more expansive contract-for-services model (i.e., Option 2.5). The features described above are not prohibitive *per se*, but they do require a more robust organization and a higher cost to implement. This may be understood as the incremental cost of greater institutional independence.

The Launch Committee notes that because the coverage ratio of market settlements versus the GMC is so high, and a lien on that revenue is a powerful financial protection for any market operator, an approach of providing the RO some access to a similar lien authority might provide a relatively lower cost solution. This might be done through the CAISO contractually or the creation of a second lien. This topic requires more investigation, given the potential effect of raising the cost of debt on affected bonds.

Contractual issue #2: Staffing

In addition to the financial liability protections described above, the cost of making the RO a more expansive institution that would be the formal outward-facing provider of EDAM and WEIM services (with actual operations under contract to the CAISO) depends on the size of the staff dedicated to the RO. As a starting point, the Launch Committee envisions a relatively skeletal organization that may scale up over time. The staff size would probably need to scale up more immediately under Option 2.5.

The Launch Committee has begun exploring how to have sufficient RO independence in the form of dedicated staff, while avoiding both a significant incremental cost and a complete disaggregation of staff familiar with the CAISO's various operations and internal structure. On the most independent and expensive end of the spectrum might be a fully parallel group of dozens of policy, legal, and technical staff dedicated solely to the RO. On the opposite end of the spectrum might be a few dedicated staff (for example, an executive director, administrative specialist, and chief counsel), with all other personnel remaining as they currently are within

²⁷ Information in this subsection is drawn from the CAISO's 2022 Audited Financial Statements, available at: <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/CAISO2022AuditedFS.pdf>; and the "2021 Official Statement" in connection with the issuance of California Statewide Communities Development Authority 2021 Series bonds, available at: <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/2021-Official-Statement.pdf>.

the CAISO. Among other considerations, the Launch Committee is aware of the challenges of a potential co-employer dynamic that could complicate liability exposure and chains of command, depending on how staff responsive to the RO is embedded within the CAISO. Clarity about potential information firewalls is another important consideration.

We provide several reference points here to inform stakeholders and elicit reactions.

- *Current CAISO staffing:* Most of the CAISO's operating costs (over two-thirds) are for compensating staff, consultants, and outside attorneys. The CAISO's draft 2024 budget includes 759 total positions at the corporation, of whom 597 are in operational services and 162 in corporate services. Within corporate services, the general counsel's office is budgeted for 38 positions, and the Stakeholder Engagement and Customer Experience division for 29 positions. Within operational services, the Market Design and Analysis division is budgeted for 59 positions.

The allocation of costs in 2024 on a functional basis indicates that \$31 million is budgeted for developing markets and infrastructure (12% of the O&M budget), and \$97 million to operate the markets and the grid (38% of the O&M budget). From a broader perspective, the CAISO's most recent triennial cost-of-service study indicates that about 45% of the corporation's annual revenue requirement is related to market services (\$108 million) and about an equal amount to system operations (\$107 million). These general numbers don't map precisely onto what the RO might do, but they do provide an idea of the scale of staff and costs for more expansive versions of offering marketing services.²⁸

- *NEPOOL example:* One reference point for the potential scale of the RO in a more modest form may be NEPOOL, the independent FERC-approved stakeholder advisory group in New England. NEPOOL advises ISO-New England (ISO-NE) on competitive wholesale market rules and has legal rights to compel ISO-NE to make alternative section 205 filings at FERC. NEPOOL itself has more than 500 members (market participants and stakeholders). It has a significant and, in some cases, determinative role over proposed market rules in New England, but as an institution it is relatively small. NEPOOL's annual operating budget for 2023 was approximately \$7 million, which covered a variety of stakeholder meeting and communication costs, in

²⁸ CAISO 2024 Draft Budget and Grid Management Charge Rates (October 2023), 11, 13, available at: <https://www.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/Draft-2024-Budget-and-Grid-Management-Charge-Rates.pdf>; and CAISO 2023 Draft Final Cost-of-Service Study, September 2023, Table 25, available at: <http://www.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/Revised-Draft-Final-2023-Cost-of-Service-Study-and-2024-2026-Grid-Management-Charge-Update.pdf>. The remaining 10% of the annual revenue requirement relates to Reliability Coordination services (8%) and congestion revenue rights services (2%).

addition to compensation for outside legal counsel (eleven attorneys), two administrative staff, and consultants.²⁹

- *Other examples:* Within the CAISO today, the Department of Market Monitoring (DMM) has an internal but autonomous role. DMM staff are CAISO employees but with reporting obligations directly to FERC and subject to management by the BoG and a Board Committee (called the DMM Oversight Committee) that includes three Board members and a WEIM GB member who is a non-voting participant. For example, the DMM Oversight Committee handles performance reviews, promotions, and other personnel matters directly. (We note that the appropriate role of the DMM itself going forward vis a vis the RO is also an open question for Step 2.) Market monitors at other RTO/ISOs may be useful reference points as well. The Reliability Coordination service within the CAISO (described below) has autonomous features as well.

The Launch Committee generally seeks feedback from stakeholders about how limited or expansive the size of the RO's dedicated staff should be, given the data and examples above, as well as fruitful employment models the Launch Committee or future RO board might consider as precedents.

Contractual issue #3: Existing contracts

The final challenge identified to date by the Launch Committee to a more expansive contractual agreement between the RO and the CAISO relates to existing contracts. It requires further investigation and feedback from stakeholders and parties to existing contracts with the CAISO.

If the RO takes on the ultimate responsibility of offering EDAM and WEIM to market participants (not merely deciding the content of market rules as in Option 2), this approach may not comport with agreements already executed by the CAISO as the service provider today, nor with the expectations of the counterparties to those agreements. This may hold true even if the RO takes on this responsibility on the condition that the CAISO alone will continue to operate the markets on a contractual basis (a sole supplier or vendor situation). The counterparties to existing the contracts may find themselves in the position of suddenly having a contract with a vendor of a service rather than the entity that has assumed ultimate responsibility for that service, albeit through a contract with the vendor.

Whether relevant contracts could be assumed collectively by the RO (as assigned by the CAISO) or would require substantial renegotiations remains an open question. The Launch Committee understands that there are approximately three dozen types of regulatory contracts between the CAISO and market participants included in or implicated by the CAISO tariff. Many of them

²⁹ NEPOOL Annual Report (2023), available at: https://nepool.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/NEPOOL_Annual_Report_2023.pdf

are pro forma. Some involve hundreds of individual contracts (for example, contracts with Scheduling Coordinators or Participating Generators). In total, there may be thousands of individual affected contracts (many entities have entered into multiple contractual agreements with the CAISO covering various roles). Assuming no material change in the affected agreements, it is possible that some may be assigned *en masse*, depending on the assignment language and other rights in the contracts. This topic requires further review.

We also note that the CAISO's existing and potentially future debt covenants may be impacted by the potential structural changes in Step 2. Like the impact on existing contracts with commercial counterparties active in the energy markets, these potential impacts must be clearly understood and considered as well, and additional analysis is required.

Conclusion about the Step 2 contractual arrangement:

The tradeoffs between Options 2 and 2.5 fundamentally relate to the expectations of stakeholders and regulators about the administrative cost, on the one hand, and institutional independence, on the other hand. Given the issues above that affect the cost, implementation speed, and potential feasibility of a full contract-for-services model, the Launch Committee seeks additional stakeholder input to inform our deliberations on how expansive an initial contractual agreement to recommend between the RO and the CAISO. The Launch Committee hopes to gain a better sense of which approach (Option 2 or 2.5) would draw in the most interested parties and increase the depth of market participation, acknowledging that administrative costs are one of the most important decisional criteria for many entities.

We also note that Options 2 and 2.5 are not mutually exclusive: over time, the RO could grow institutionally and incrementally to the point of arriving at Option 2.5 and entering into a more thoroughgoing service contract with the CAISO. In addition, there may be other fruitful ways to structure independent governance that could grow out of Option 2 for future consideration. The Launch Committee looks forward to stakeholder feedback on these topics.

4) Key Element: Creating various pathways for services beyond WEIM/EDAM using the RO as a governing entity and potentially a host entity for those services.

The Launch Committee has focused most of our attention on the details of implementing Step 2 for the energy markets, given FERC's approval of EDAM and the pressing question in the West for utilities and balancing authorities about whether to join a given day-ahead market. But we have also explored whether the overall approach to Step 2 outlined above would allow the RO to govern or host additional services that are the hallmarks of an RTO. We have tentatively concluded that it does. This section provides an initial explanation of that conclusion, which likely holds true regardless of the resolution of open issues above related to energy market governance.

The plausible pathways for services beyond WEIM/EDAM would vary based on the service to be provided. The Launch Committee is not recommending a particular structure for any given service but has evaluated the plausibility of extending such services in a number of alternative scenarios. We observe that what might be called the “cafeteria plan” of à la carte services likely has some practical limitations due to complexity and administrative costs. Many services may require a large critical mass of interested entities; others services may only make sense to offer grouped together. At this stage, the Launch Committee does not anticipate focusing additional time on more than the broad descriptions below of potential pathways beyond WEIM/EDAM. We also note that these further pathways may be viewed as part of the maturation of Step 2 in its later stages, or as part of Step 3 described in the introduction—a full suite of market, transmission, and related services offered by RTOs.

The Launch Committee has identified the following general categories and sub-categories of services beyond WEIM/EDAM that are part of the CAISO’s service offerings today:

- *Market services beyond WEIM/EDAM:*
 - Ancillary services
 - Convergence bidding
 - Congestion revenue rights
- *Reliability Coordination*
- *Transmission control:*
 - Transmission operations, including congestion management
 - A consolidated transmission service tariff, including procedures for requesting transmission and interconnection service
 - Flow-based, financial transmission reservations
 - De-pancaking of some transmission rates
 - Regional and interregional transmission planning
- *Balancing authority services*
- *Resource adequacy provisions*

Market services: With respect to additional market services, convergence bidding is already partially implicated by EDAM. Further, market-optimized ancillary services have been anticipated as a potential future feature of EDAM through the CAISO stakeholder process. For this reason, these services may be covered already by the “apply to” test going forward. Should they be more fully integrated into EDAM through a market design change, they may be brought under the WEIM GB’s authority in Step 1 or the RO’s authority in Step 2 without any further governance adjustments. Congestion revenue rights made available through auction and allocation are most likely tied to more fundamental transmission control reforms described below.

Reliability Coordination: “Reliability Coordination” (RC) is a precisely defined NERC function for a wide area view of the bulk electric system and procedures and authority to prevent or

mitigate emergency operating situations in a day-ahead and real-time basis. RC is not a generic reliability function but rather a specific monitoring and coordinating role across other entities registered with NERC. The CAISO currently fills the role of Reliability Coordinator under the “RC West” service moniker for most of the BAs in the West, a service that began in 2019. An Oversight Committee comprised of representatives from each BA and transmission operator that takes RC service from the CAISO currently provide input and guidance to the RC West management related to the CAISO’s performance of the RC function. Reliability Coordination may be a natural candidate for independent governance through the RO, upon its formation. RC West has little inter-dependence in the CAISO tariff with other CAISO services. As a critical West-wide reliability service, the option of migrating authority over RC West to the RO deserves careful evaluation by stakeholders and affected parties.

Transmission control: Operational control of transmission by a central organization is a hallmark of RTOs, along with the attendant reforms to transmission ratemaking (including de-pancaking), scheduling, and tariff consolidation. Some Western market participants and stakeholders view the transmission paradigm of an RTO/ISO, in contrast to the present transmission paradigm in the bilateral Western market, as the fundamental wholesale market-related reform that the West as a whole has not yet broached. The CAISO’s ongoing and nontransferrable management responsibility in Step 2 for its BA function complicates but does not necessarily impede transmission control as a service that the RO could govern. For example, some de-pancaking could occur through bilateral reciprocity agreements between the CAISO and transmission owners not party to the Transmission Control Agreement, or through further evolution to the EDAM access charge; more consolidated approaches such as “highway/byway” cost allocation for new transmission, or zonal transmission access charges, could also be pursued without impinging on separated BAAs. Offering consolidated transmission operational control, transmission service, transmission rate de-pancaking, and a congestion revenue rights product through the RO may be complicated by continuing to have separate BAAs from the CAISO, but multiple credible options remain to offer the various aspects of these critical, definitional functions of an RTO. The Launch Committee looks forward to more specific stakeholder feedback on this important topic.

Balancing authority service: Because of the preservation of the CAISO BAA noted above, consolidated BA service via the RO could only be offered as part of a separate BAA apart from the CAISO BAA. This may still be a credible option for non-CAISO BAAs. For example, MISO offers one instructive example, given the persistence of separate “Local BAAs” within the RTO’s BAA. The retention of some legacy BA functions in MISO, mostly by transmission owners, occurred alongside consolidated transmission operations and a single transmission service tariff. In the West, the door would also remain open to consolidation of non-CAISO BAAs into a single BAA in parallel to the CAISO BAA, creating an opportunity to co-optimize load, balance, and interchange across two large BAAs.

Resource adequacy (RA) provisions: RA rules specific to the CAISO BAA would not fall under the “apply to” test and would remain under the purview of the CAISO BoG under Step 2. These rules flow in large part from California-specific requirements set by California state agencies, so these CAISO services and tariff provisions would remain as they are today. Other EDAM Entities would meet their own RA standards through the Western Resource Adequacy Program and state-specific obligations. The Launch Committee is aware that the design phase of EDAM devoted substantial attention to ensuring interoperability across these different RA programs.

Migration or addition of new services via the RO:

In general, the difference between the potential approaches to additional services hinges on whether the relevant tariff provisions remain in the single integrated tariff administered by the CAISO or are placed in a separate tariff filed by the RO. Either of those options are available for additional services, regardless of whether the energy markets are governed under Option 2 or Option 2.5, as discussed above. The Launch Committee also notes that the traditional framework to obtaining additional services from the CAISO remains open to entities willing to become, for example, a Participating Transmission Owner whose transmission facilities would become part of the CAISO Controlled Grid.³⁰

The Launch Committee has identified the following potential approaches via the RO:

- 1) Migration of services from sole CAISO BoG authority within the same tariff:
 - A transition to *Joint Authority* between the BoG and the RO, with or without a co-equal dual filing right for the RO at FERC.
 - A transition to *Primary Authority* of the RO, with the retention of a co-equal dual filing right for the BoG (as in Step 1 for energy markets).
 - A transition to *Sole Authority* of the RO within the same tariff, just as Step 2 apply to the energy markets.
- 2) Addition of services within the same tariff without a migration:
 - The CAISO, at the RO’s behest, could add a *new* service within the same tariff, subject from the start to sole RO authority.
- 3) Transition to Sole Authority of the RO but in a newly filed separate tariff:
 - The RO could file its own separate tariff at FERC to gain authority over an existing service offered by the CAISO, while the CAISO removed the corresponding tariff sections.

³⁰ The CAISO Controlled Grid is defined in the Transmission Control Agreement, the foundational agreement of the CAISO that governs the relationship between the CAISO and its participating transmission owners (PTOs). It refers to the system of transmission lines and associated facilities of the PTOs that have been placed under the CAISO’s operational control. Note that the CAISO does not need to have operational control of transmission facilities to perform the market operator function. Similarly, the CAISO BA function overlaps with, but is not coterminous with, the CAISO Controlled Grid. The Transmission Control Agreement is available here: <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/TransmissionControlAgreement.pdf>.

- 4) Establishment of a new service the RO would offer from scratch:
- Such services would be offered directly by the RO under its own tariff, with or without the CAISO operating the service under contract.
 - We note that this approach may be the only option for offering consolidated BAA services, for example, to interested EDAM Entities, given the CAISO's continued retention of its unconsolidated BA function.

The Launch Committee offers several general observations on these approaches. First, the provision of contract services by the CAISO would depend on decisions made by the CAISO BoG about the corporation's ability and willingness to provide such services. The Step 2 proposal here avoids a further need for legislative change to allow the CAISO BoG to make those decisions, but the overall approach to migrating authority or entering into new contractual arrangements remains voluntary.

Some services might involve a gradual migration of authority from the BoG to the RO, replicating the incremental path taken by the energy markets, including potential participation triggers. Others might lend themselves to a single, one-step transfer from sole BoG authority to sole RO authority. Others might have some enduring provisions subject to shared authority (Joint or Primary). The result would likely be an RO with a mix of *sole* 205 rights and *shared* 205 rights in the same tariff as the BoG, as well possibly its own separate tariff limited to specified services.

Any transfer of authority from the BoG to the RO would require at least one, and possibly two, votes by the BoG at the start and possibly end of initiatives to modify tariff provisions, which would include adjusting their decisional classification. Any additional transfers would also be bound by the legal limitations discussed above such as the protections of the CAISO as a corporation. A decision made voluntarily by the BoG to assign or allocate its existing 205 rights by subject matter or tariff provision appears to be essential for compliance with the Federal Power Act. The accompanying legal analysis describes this factor.

Because some services and tariff provisions may continue to require some form of shared authority between the BoG and RO, the Launch Committee anticipates the need for a potential additional classification test, or modifications to the existing "apply to" test, for services beyond EDAM. The need for, at minimum, refinements to the existing test may also be dictated by the retention of the CAISO BA function, as described already above.

In conclusion, the model described here of incremental, voluntary service offerings over time could eventually mature to include the full suite of typical RTO services, albeit in a form unique to the West.

C. Legal Analysis of the Step 2 Straw Proposal

The Perkins Coie legal analysis that accompanies this straw proposal is based on existing California state law. It provides guidance about what elements of current law would need to change legislatively to enable the full Step 2 proposal described here and “substantially mitigate the risk of legal challenge.” Counsel also evaluated the separate federal legal risk of the various options scoped by the Launch Committee in the Evaluation Framework Paper. Counsel concluded that the options reviewed above for Step 2 (Options 2 and 2.5) are likely feasible, given FERC policy and precedent. Given that Options 2 and 2.5 maintain a single integrated tariff, at least at the outset of Step 2, these options do exhibit slightly higher, but not unreasonable, regulatory risk at FERC. More detail is provided in the legal analysis. The Launch Committee welcomes additional stakeholder views on this evaluation.

IV. NARROWED OPTIONS

The Launch Committee is narrowing the scope of work to focus on the most viable options that align with the Evaluation Criteria (see Appendix G). Step 1 centers on the original Option 0 design, and Step 2 reflects Option 2 and a variation of Option 3, which is referred to as Option 2.5. This section discusses the Launch Committee’s election to defer consideration of Options 1, 3, and 4, at least on a standalone basis. Note that Appendix H has a matrix showing the Launch Committee’s initial evaluation of the risks and challenges presented by the various options based on our eight evaluation criteria and the legal risks.

A. Option 1 - RO Primary Filing Rights + CAISO Joint Filing Rights, Tariff, & Operations

Considering the near-term incremental nature of Step 1 as proposed in this paper, Step 2 warrants greater movement than Option 1 can offer toward the independent governance that the Pathways Initiative is intended to achieve, and that Launch Committee believes can be achieved in Step 2. Stakeholder comments support this position as well. At this point, the Launch Committee is not recommending further evaluation of Option 1.

B. Option 3 – RO Sole Rights with CAISO Contract for Services with CAISO

While Option 3 has remained in the scope of consideration until now, the Launch Committee has moved toward a modified approach, new Option 2.5. Options 2.5 and 3 contemplate comparable degrees of governance separation from the CAISO necessary to enable RO Sole Authority. The options differ, however, in the treatment of the CAISO tariff. Option 3 contemplates separating the CAISO tariff to enable a standalone tariff administered by the RO, while Option 2.5 contemplates the CAISO continuing to administer, but not govern, a single integrated tariff. Option 2.5 offers the advantage of simplicity compared with Option 3.0; separating the tariff would require a substantial investment of time and resources, as detailed

above in this paper. It is also possible that Option 2.5 could also facilitate lower costs and other reduced obligations, which are currently being investigated by the Launch Committee. For these reasons, the Launch Committee has focused more intently on Option 2.5, setting Option 3.0 to the side for now, to gain stakeholders viewpoints on the critical underlying tension between Options 2 and 2.5: independence vs. cost.

C. Option 4 - Spinoff Market Operator with Full 205 Rights

Option 4, which contemplates a fully independent and separate RO that assumes full responsibility for a separate tariff and takes on an operational role, received a relatively high degree of support from some stakeholders, given the full independence from the CAISO that it proposes. The Launch Committee's exploration of options, however, has highlighted the strong tension between two critical goals: independence and leveraging existing infrastructure (i.e., keeping costs low). Option 4, by enabling a complete organizational separation from the CAISO, would require participants to fund substantial levels of start-up and ongoing operations costs. Costs would include among other things securing substantial office space, market operations equipment, software, and infrastructure, staff, and capitalization of necessary reserves. The data cited above about costs associated with the market operations of the CAISO should serve as anchoring information for what Option 4 might cost. Option 4 would almost certainly require legislative change in California to enable CAISO BA participation, just as the other options do, however, the necessary change would likely be more contentious and comprehensive than what might be required for other options.

The Launch Committee recognizes that, as some stakeholders suggest, the RO could evolve towards Option 4 should stakeholders, including those in California, consider the benefits to outweigh the costs or non-California entities elect to pursue a more thorough suite of RTO-related services. While Option 4 maximizes some of the criteria that the Launch Committee prioritized for the Pathways Initiative effort, it has significant timeline and cost constraints and a higher political risk. Since there are other options that deliver the same or only slightly fewer benefits with lower costs and a shorter timeframe, the Launch Committee has decided not to pursue further evaluation of Option 4 at this time.

V. NEXT STEPS AND STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK

A. Step 1

The Launch Committee will evaluate the stakeholder feedback and consider adjustments to the proposal. If the Launch Committee decides to recommend Step 1, we will work with the CAISO to present this proposal to the CAISO BoG and WEIM GB. If those bodies accept the proposal, the CAISO will conduct its own stakeholder process and evaluate a final proposal for potential approval.

B. Step 2

Given the complexity of the options the Launch Committee has explored for Step 2, the Launch Committee is seeking more fundamental input from stakeholders regarding comfort with and preference for the different aspects of the proposed options that create various tradeoffs. The Launch Committee will evaluate the stakeholder feedback received, continue to research open issues, and then develop a more refined proposal.

It is important to note that, to date, the Launch Committee has focused on exploring the options described in the Evaluation Framework Paper. If stakeholders have ideas of other structures or options that could mitigate some of the tradeoffs evaluated in this paper, the Launch Committee welcomes those ideas.

C. Stakeholder Feedback


Readers may refer to the accompanying stakeholder guidance document for the specific questions and areas feedback sought by the Launch Committee on this straw proposal.

Appendix A – Option Comparison Table

	Status Quo	Option 0	Option 0.5	Option 1	Option 2	Option 2.5	Option 3	Option 4
New Corporate Entity	No	No	No	Yes (RO)	Yes (RO)	Yes (RO)	Yes (RO)	Yes (RO)
Market Rules Governance	Joint	EIM Primary	EIM Sole	RO Primary	RO Sole	RO Sole	RO Sole	RO Sole
CAISO Veto Rights (Market Rules)	Yes (sole filer; Exigent Circumstances)	Time-Critical Exigent Circumstances	Time-Critical Exigent Circumstances	Time-Critical Exigent Circumstances	No	No	No	No
205 Filing Legal Rights	CAISO	CAISO	CAISO	CAISO	RO Sole	RO Sole	RO Sole	RO Sole
Vesting of Authority	Delegation	Delegation	Delegation	Delegation	Delegation or Transfer	Transfer	Transfer	Transfer
Dispute Resolution Outcome	Single CAISO filing	CAISO files both WEIM GB and Board proposals	CAISO files WEIM GB proposal	CAISO files both WEIM GB and Board proposals	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Market Tariff Administration	CAISO	CAISO	CAISO	CAISO	CAISO	CAISO	RO Sole	RO Sole
Market Operation	CAISO	CAISO	CAISO	CAISO	CAISO	CAISO	CAISO	RO Sole
CAISO/RO Relationship	Tariffed	Tariffed	Tariffed	Tariff / Market Services Agreement	Tariff / Market Services Agreement	Tariff / Market Operating Agreement	Market Operating Agreement	None

Appendix B – Step 1 Schematic

Step 1 Proposal



¹ WEIM Charter amended to reflect a requirement to consider the public interest in decision-making
² If filed as “time-critical” exigent circumstances, the WEIM GB may object with FERC after-the-fact to the CAISO action and redirect the issue to the §2.2.2 dispute resolution procedure
³ Dual filing required even if either body proposes no change to the tariff (i.e., no “pocket veto”)
⁴ CAISO can exercise exigent circumstances filings at any of three points: (1) sua sponte, as a BoG decision, (2) BoG consideration of a WEIM GB proposal for its consent agenda, or (3) as an outcome of the dispute resolution process

Appendix C – Current Joint Authority over Market Rule Changes

From the Charter for WEIM and EDAM Governance, as amended by the CAISO Board of Governors on March 20, 2024³¹

2.2.1 Decisions and Recommendations about Market Rule Changes

Through the ISO bylaws, the Board of Governors has delegated certain authority to the WEIM Governing Body to approve or reject proposed amendments to the Tariff. The Board has also authorized the WEIM Governing Body to provide it with advisory input on certain other market rules, as follows:

- “Joint authority”: The WEIM Governing Body will have joint authority with the Board of Governors to approve or reject a proposal to change or establish a tariff rule applicable to the WEIM/EDAM Entity balancing authority areas, WEIM/EDAM Entities, or other market participants within the WEIM/EDAM Entity balancing authority areas, in their capacity as participants in the WEIM/EDAM. The WEIM/EDAM Governing Body will also have joint authority with the Board of Governors to approve or reject a proposal to change or establish any tariff rule for the day-ahead or real-time markets that directly establishes or changes the formation of any locational marginal price(s) for a product that is common to the overall WEIM or EDAM markets. The scope of this joint authority excludes, without limitation, any other proposals to change or establish tariff rule(s) applicable only to the CAISO balancing authority area or to the CAISO-controlled grid. Note: For the avoidance of any doubt, that the joint authority definition is not intended to cover balancing authority-specific measures, such as any parameters or constraints, the CAISO may use to ensure reliable operation within its balancing authority area.
- “Advisory authority”: The WEIM/EDAM Governing Body may provide advisory input over proposals to change or establish tariff rules that would apply to the real-time and/or day-ahead market but are not within the scope of joint authority.

³¹ Redline available at: <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/AttachmentB-CharterforEnergyImbalanceMarketGovernanceproposedredline.pdf>

APPENDIX D

The Public Interest and Market Governance

March 5, 2024

Regulators catalyzed the West-Wide Pathways Initiative to maximize customer benefits across as broad a footprint as possible.³² The enabling statutes for the CAISO set a foundation and template for this focus on customer benefits that can be extended to all customers served by the market operator.³³

As paths begin to come into focus, it is important to consider how the public interest and customer benefits remain centered in emerging options. There are two intertwined issues:

- 1) How customer interests, including affordability, are safeguarded in market design.
- 2) How state policies, even as they differ across the West, are respected in market design.

Customer Interest

In the Multi-State Governance Principles, published through CREPC and signed onto by regulators from across the Western Interconnection, Board Independence was elaborated as,

“The independent board should be diverse, represent a range of sectors and geographies, and be expert enough to *substantively engage in decision making to balance diverse interests, including and beyond market participants*. The board may be advised by other bodies and delegate authority, though transparency in delegated decision making remains critical. *Customers are best protected when the board can directly weigh public benefit across the market footprint.*”³⁴

³² <https://www.westernenergyboard.org/wp-content/uploads/Letter-to-CREPC-WIEB-Regulators-Call-for-West-Wide-Market-Solution-7-14-23-1.pdf>

³³ California Public Utilities Code Section 345.5 (b) in part reads: To ensure the reliability of electric service and the health and safety of the public, the Independent System Operator shall manage the transmission grid and related energy markets in a manner that is consistent with all of the following:

- (1) Making the most efficient use of available energy resources. . . .
- (2) Reducing, to the extent possible, overall economic cost to the state’s consumers.
- (3) Applicable state law intended to protect the public’s health and the environment.
- (4) Maximizing availability of existing electric generation resources necessary to meet the needs of the state’s electricity consumers.
- (5) Conducting internal operations in a manner that minimizes cost impact on ratepayers to the extent practicable and consistent with the provisions of this chapter.
- (6) Communicating with all balancing area authorities in California in a manner that supports electrical reliability.

³⁴ Emphasis added. The Multistate Governance Principles are available at <https://www.westernenergyboard.org/wp-content/uploads/Multistate-Governance-Principles-4-25-22.pdf>

The enabling statutes that led to the creation of the CAISO set out expectations for the market that similarly center customer interests, reliability and affordability. The market is a tool for efficient resource dispatch and cost reductions.³⁵

As the Launch Committee considers further empowering the WEIM Governing Body in Step 1 and creating a stand-alone RO in Step 2, the market transitions away from a board with a legislated mandate focused on customer impacts in a single state. The move away from a single state is necessary and appropriate – but it is critical to consider how to carry the customer centered mandate forward. That customer protection foundation is a critical through-line back to the enabling statutes that ensures the delegation and evolution carry forward a fundamental, positive aspect of CAISO. **The Governing Body’s governing documents may need to be updated to reflect these legislated mandates more clearly, for all customers in the footprint.**

State Policies

The Western EIM Governing Body and the CAISO Board of Governors have sought to ensure reciprocity or mutual respect of state policies in the WEIM footprint - implementing some state policies through the market but limiting their application to certain zones within the footprint. State regulators in the BOSR have similarly focused on limiting unreasonable impacts on other states. This approach reflects the reality that state policies already create impacts throughout the WECC via bilateral transactions, including at wholesale market hubs, but that the centralized market is not a tool to force one state’s resource decisions or costs on another state’s customers.

The newly adopted decision principle articulates much of how state regulators have addressed this state policy issue in recent years. As governance evolves away from a board appointed by one state’s policymakers to a stakeholder-selected board, **it is important that this principle of respect for individual state policies is captured and embedded in the stakeholder-nominated board’s duties and mandate.**

³⁵ The CAISO Board of Governors has been clear that this legislated mandate does not require them to place California customer interests above those of other states’ customers in decision-making today. Customer interests are deeply intertwined in the Western EIM and thus require thoughtful balancing of interests across the footprint. This position was elaborated in the Governance Review Committee.

APPENDIX E

Proposed Modifications to WEIM Charter

2. Mission and Responsibilities


2.1 Mission: The WEIM Governing Body shall promote, protect and expand the success of the WEIM and EDAM for the benefit of its participants as a whole **and the consumers they serve**, with due consideration of the interests of all participants in the ISO's real-time and day-ahead markets, including both participants transacting in the ISO's balancing authority area and participants transacting in WEIM/EDAM balancing authority areas (meaning the balancing authority areas of WEIM/EDAM entities, collectively).

The WEIM Governing Body shall make decisions and recommendations that will:


- **Preserve the benefits of existing market offerings and expand them across as broad a footprint as possible;**
- **Make the most efficient use of available energy resources;**
- **Reduce, to the extent possible, overall economic cost to customers within the market footprint;**
- **Maximize availability of existing electric generation resources necessary to promote reliability and meet the needs of all affected electricity customers;**
- **Help control costs to participate and in internal operations so as to ensure that favorable cost/benefit ratios are maintained for the benefit of market participants and customers;**
- **Protect the ISO market, including the WEIM and EDAM, its participants, and customers against the exercise of market power or manipulation and otherwise further just and reasonable market outcomes;**
- **Facilitate and maintain compliance with other applicable legal requirements, including but not limited to environmental regulations and states' renewable energy goals;**
- **Respect state authority to set procurement, environmental, reliability, and other public interest policies.**
- **Allow WEIM/EDAM Entities to withdraw from the WEIM/EDAM prior to any action that would cause or create an exit fee; and**
- **Allow options to expand the functionality of the ISO market to provide additional services.**

Appendix F – Step 2 Schematics

Option 2 for WEIM/EDAM



Option 2.5 for WEIM/EDAM



* Corporate protections will give assurances to CAISO that RO will not take actions that will impair CAISO's ability to meet its obligations.

** The RO's role is formally providing the EDAM/WEIM services to interested entities, in addition to deciding the market rules, supported by a services contract with the CAISO to operate the markets.

Appendix G – Evaluation Criteria

#	Criteria
1	Maximized net benefits, including reliability, affordability and environmental benefits, recognizing startup and ongoing costs, and considering both new benefits and impacts on existing benefits.
2	Equitable representation across the Western region and among all market participants, including for a wide range of legal entities.
3	A governance structure independent of any single state, participant, or class of participants.
4	Organizational flexibility to accommodate future expansion of regional solutions and to create a credible and timely path to a voluntary RTO, including the balancing authority and transmission planning functions.
5	Optionality to allow market participants to choose the market services they value.
6	Preservation of existing balancing authorities' ability to maintain independence, authority, and governance.
7	An implementation timeline that promotes broad market participation.
8	Respect for state authority to set procurement, environmental, reliability and other public interest policies.

Appendix H - Evaluation Criteria Comparison Chart for the Commencement of Step 2

	Option 1	Option 2	Option 2.5	Option 3	Option 4
1. Maximized net benefits	(++) Because Option 1 leaves all market operations and associated institutional capabilities with the CAISO, the RO start-up and operating costs would be small, likely covering the RO board costs, and minimal policy and legal staff. Minimal disruption or separation of the market operation functions and staff would maintain existing reliability, affordability, and environmental benefits, although expanding those benefits would be limited to the additional market services the RO would be able to offer without independence from the CAISO BoG.	(+++) Because Option 2 leaves all market operations and associated institutional capabilities with the CAISO, the RO start-up and operating costs would be small, likely covering the RO board costs, and minimal policy and legal staff. Minimal disruption or separation of the market operation functions and staff would maintain existing reliability, affordability, and environmental benefits.	(?) With the transfer of the responsibility over the market service offering from the CAISO to the RO, there is likely an increase in costs associated with the number of staff, assets, and liabilities. The scale of these costs would depend greatly on the legal structure and regulatory responsibilities the RO takes on.	(--) Option 3 provides some cost savings as compared to Option 4 since the CAISO continues to operate the market. However, it will likely incur higher costs than Options 2 and 2.5, given the increase in regulatory responsibilities and other liabilities associated with overseeing a service offering and a completely separate tariff.	(---) Option 4 would likely require significantly more start-up and operating costs than other options because it would likely duplicate investments many market participants have already made in CAISO through the WEIM and EDAM. While this approach may attract a larger footprint in concept, it is difficult at this time to foresee the incremental value offsetting its greater costs.

	Option 1	Option 2	Option 2.5	Option 3	Option 4
2. Equitable representation among all market participants	(++++) The board of the RO would be fully independent in all options. The RO-specific stakeholder engagement process may be evaluated and determined through the process outlined in the Launch Committee’s U.S. DOE grant application submitted in January 2024.				
3. Independent governance structure	(+) Option 1 materially increases independence from the status quo, but up to the limit of giving the RO primary authority over market rules—an outcome that Option 0 would already achieve in Step 1. Option 1 creates additional institutional independence but little or no additional legal independence beyond Option 0.	(++/+++) In Option 2, the CAISO BoG delegates or transfers sole authority over the market rules to the RO, including all control over the content development and stakeholding process to determine what the CAISO BoG will file. The RO has sole authority to file under section 205 or to determine the content of 205 filings, subject to common corporate protections for the CAISO. The CAISO continues market operations and tariff administration under a contractual agreement with the RO. The CAISO BoG would not approve or have any dispute resolution rights over changes to the market rules.	(+++) Option 2.5 has the same governance independence over market rules as Option 2 and goes beyond Option 2 by adding other institutional responsibilities and obligations. These include legal and compliance obligations that may create more flexibility and opportunities for increased independence as the RO evolves. The market rules remain in the CAISO tariff, and the CAISO operates the markets as a vendor under contract with the RO. Option 2.5 offers greater <i>institutional</i> independence but probably not greater <i>governance</i> independence.	(+++) Option 3 provides a similar level of independence as Option 2.5, with the primary difference being that the RO has its own tariff that has the market rules, rather than authority over the market rules contained in sections in the CAISO tariff. The CAISO would operate the markets as a vendor under contract with the RO.	(++++) Option 4 maximizes governance and institutional independence with no ongoing operational relationship between the RO and CAISO.

	Option 1	Option 2	Option 2.5	Option 3	Option 4
4. Organizational flexibility	(+) Because the CAISO BoG retains some material authority over changes to market rules, the limited governance independence may limit the RO's ability to attract other Western participants to future service offerings. The RO could still offer separate services, either with authority nested in the integrated CAISO tariff, or by filing its own separate tariff.	(++/+++) The RO could develop new and additional market services under a new and separate tariff. It could also obtain greater authority over other services within the CAISO's integrated tariff. To offer a fuller suite of RTO services in the future, the RO will likely need greater institutional capabilities beyond what would be required to govern the energy markets alone in Option 2. The CAISO BoG would also likely need to approve transferring governance authority over additional services in the future.	(++/+++) Option 2.5 may offer similar or slightly more flexibility than Option 2 since the RO would already have the additional institutional capabilities beyond Option 2 to offer new services directly to market participants. Unlike Option 3, the RO would not yet have a separate tariff filed at FERC. Like in Option 2, the CAISO BoG would likely need to approve transferring governance authority over additional services in the future (as opposed to new services offered by the RO).	(+++) Because the RO under Option 3 has its own tariff, it may be situated slightly better to add new services to that separate tariff. In addition, like in Option 2.5, the RO would have additional institutional capabilities beyond Option 2 to offer such services. Like in Options 2 and 2.5, the CAISO BoG would likely need to approve transferring governance authority over additional services in the future (as opposed to new services offered by the RO).	(++++) Option 4 would enable the RO to develop additional market services as Western stakeholders desire without additional material governance changes (aside from that required by the specific market services).
5. Optionality for new services	(-) Because adding new market services would likely be more limited in practice (given the more limited governance independence of Option 1), market	(++) For Options 2, 2.5, and 3, future optionality will depend on the institutional capability of the RO to add and offer new market services, on the CAISO's willingness to operate	(++) Same as Option 2	(++) Same as Option 2	(++/--) Since Option 4 is fully independent, it can offer whatever market services Western stakeholders desire within a structure that makes operational and economic sense.

	Option 1	Option 2	Option 2.5	Option 3	Option 4
	participants may have more limited options for new services.	those services (if the RO doesn't plan to conduct operations itself), and on the contractual agreement between the two entities.			However, unless Option 4 spun off the transmission control and other non-BA functions of the CAISO, in addition to the energy markets function, the optionality promised by Option 4 might preclude transmission control integrated with the existing CAISO controlled grid.
6. Preservation of BA independence	(++) Option 1 would not change anything about any BA functions and authority.	(++) Options 2, 2.5, and 3 are all built with the assumption that CAISO would retain control over its BA. Evaluation is ongoing for these options about how to create a situation that enables the CAISO BA to choose to participate in a new RO's service offering in a similar way to other BAs.	(++) Same as Option 2	(++) Same as Option 2	(++) Option 4 would remove all market functions from CAISO, leaving the BA functions and authority (along with other non-market functions such as transmission control and resource adequacy provisions) under the CAISO Board of Governors. The CAISO BA would have the same opportunity to join the RO as other BAs in the West.

	Option 1	Option 2	Option 2.5	Option 3	Option 4
7. Timeline for Implementation	(+++) Because Option 1 makes minimal change to the CAISO governance structure beyond Option 0, and would likely not require legislative change, it could be implemented relatively quickly. The process that would likely take the longest is FERC approval of a revised tariff.	(+) Option 2 likely requires legislative change in California. However, if and when a bill passes, implementation of Option 2 should be able to occur relatively quickly since the RO's responsibilities are limited to sole governance authority, as opposed to additional institutional capabilities that mirror an RTO/ISO. This would also require FERC approval of tariff changes.	(-) Options 2.5 and 3 likely require legislative change in California. Because there would also be an increased level of legal and compliance obligations as well as some form of assignment or other complexity with existing contracts between the CAISO and market participant counterparties, implementation would likely take longer than Option 2. This option would also require FERC approval of tariff changes.	(-/--) Same as Option 2.5, but with the added time required to separate out the current CAISO tariff into separately filed tariffs.	(----) Because of the complexity of fully separating the market and BA functions of CAISO, as well as the need to start at least some of the business infrastructure of the RO as a full market operator from scratch, Option 4 will take longer than the other options that the Launch Committee is evaluating. With utilities in the West making day-ahead market decisions in 2024, some of which are dependent on having a path to market services beyond a day-ahead market, the implementation timeline of Option 4 creates significant challenges.
8. Respect for state authority	(++++) All of the options would include development of a new RO with a governance structure that would incorporate processes and procedures for adequate state representation and input that ensure that the RO operates market services with the public interest in mind and in a way that maintains each state's equal ability to set and enforce its own energy policies and standards. The Launch Committee is currently evaluating ways to strengthen the role of the states in the structure and governance of the RO.				

	Option 1	Option 2	Option 2.5	Option 3	Option 4
Political viability/legal risk	The legal analysis indicated moderately low legal risk in California under current law, suggesting that legislative change would not be necessary to move to this structure. Legal risk before FERC is also low.	The legal analysis indicated material legal risk in California under current law and a likely need for legislative change to implement this structure. Legal risk before FERC is moderately low, with a lack of precisely analogous precedents for this structure.	The legal analysis indicated material legal risk in California under current law and a likely need for legislative change to implement this structure. Legal risk before FERC is moderately low, with a lack of precisely analogous precedents for this structure.	The legal analysis indicated high legal risk in California under current law and a likely need for legislative change to implement this structure. Legal risk before FERC is low.	The legal analysis indicated high legal risk in California under current law and a likely need for legislative change to implement this structure in a way that will facilitate participation by the CAISO BA. The members of the Launch Committee have identified Option 4 as potentially contentious politically, with much greater challenge for legislative support. Legal risk before FERC is low.